Abstract
In the past few decades, an increase in articles publication that analyze and discuss environmental issues can be observed in the literature. However, because the global warming problem, various government agencies have rigorous environmental rules and policies, to such an extent that they are forcing companies particularly those that make up the automotive industry, to adopt measures to reduce the pollution generated by their supply chain, since it is one of the industries that generates most pollution globally. Thus, the objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence that helps fill the gap in the current literature, and to analyze the relationship between green supply chain management and business performance, through quantitative, explanatory research, and correlational, through the application of structural equation models. The results obtained show that green supply chain management is correlated by 47.6% with business performance, which allows to conclude that green supply chain management not only improves environmental sustainability, but also increases business performance of companies in the automotive industry.
Highlights
E purpose of this paper is twofold: First, an analysis of the direct effect of ownership structure and boards of directors on insider trading
We examine the possible moderating effect the concentration of ownership has on the disciplinary role of boards in preventing this market practice. e results of the multiple regression and hierarchical multiple regression show the negative effect of both concentration of property and the portion of independent directors on insider trading
Gobierno corporativo e insider trading: la concentración de la propiedad como variable moderadora del rol de control de los consejos
Summary
El con icto de intereses generado por la separación entre propiedad y control (Berle & Means, 1932), formalizado por la teoría de la agencia (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1979), sugieren que los accionistas desean maximizar el valor de la empresa, mientras que los gerentes actúan en su propio interés, que no necesariamente coincide con los intereses de los accionistas. Fidrmuc et al (2006) analizaron la relación entre concentración de propiedad e insider trading desde la óptica del gobierno corporativo, y encontraron que en grandes empresas del Reino Unido el control por grandes accionistas externos reduce las rentabilidades del insider trading. La investigación de Tobar, Del Brío & De Miguel (2017) para el mercado español evidenció la coexistencia de los efectos de control y de expropiación entre concentración de propiedad y los CAR’s de las operaciones de compra de los insiders. Al derivar el correspondiente punto de corte de la relación se determina que solo a partir de una muy alta concentración de propiedad del principal accionista (mayor al 55%) se da un efecto de atrincheramiento (positivo sobre el insider trading). La concentración de la propiedad ejerce un efecto negativo sobre el insider trading
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
