Abstract
To study the impact of government subsidies and altruistic preferences on green supply chain innovation, Stackelberg game theory and numerical simulation are used to analyze and verify the optimal decision-making of enterprises under different decision-making models. The results show that the two methods of government subsidies can improve product greenness, corporate profits, and overall supply chain performance. While only the unilateral altruistic preference of the manufacturer or retailer can improve product greenness, the profit of the other member, and the overall profit of the green supply chain, doing so will reduce its own profit. When the two members have the same degree of altruistic preference, the retailer’s altruistic preference is more conducive to improving product greenness. Increasing government subsidies can strengthen, to a certain extent, the effect of altruistic preference on product greenness, the profit of the other member, and the profit of the green supply chain. However, when the manufacturer implements altruistic preference, if the government subsidy exceeds a certain range, then the increase in the government subsidy will accelerate the decline of the manufacturer’s own profit.
Highlights
A green supply chain model that runs through the concept of “Green Sustainable Development” and aims to reduce the negative impact of corporate activities on the environment has developed rapidly and attracted widespread attention from all walks of life [6]
The main contributions of this article are: First, we combine altruistic preferences with government subsidies to systematically study the impact of green supply chain innovation and development when manufacturers and retailers are altruistic, which differs from previous work in which only either manufacturers or consumers are individually subsidized, and makes up for the previous lack of green supply chain research
Unlike the previous literature on altruistic preferences, it takes the weighted average of the company’s own profits and the overall profits of the supply chain as a utility function [20, 21], but we suppose that the company weighs its own profits and the other’s profits, and simultaneously introduces altruistic preference behavior as a ranged variable into it as a utility function. ird, we develop green innovation efficiency to explore its impact on the green supply chain, which has not been considered in prior literature
Summary
The call for environmental protection and green development is growing, which gradually affects the formulation and implementation of major national policies and has an important impact on the planning and production of enterprises [1]. The main contributions of this article are: First, we combine altruistic preferences with government subsidies to systematically study the impact of green supply chain innovation and development when manufacturers and retailers are altruistic, which differs from previous work in which only either manufacturers or consumers are individually subsidized, and makes up for the previous lack of green supply chain research. E rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a literature review; Section 3 is a model description and construction; Section 4 is a model solution; Section 5 analyzes the equilibrium results, discusses the different effects of different government subsidies and altruistic preferences on the supply chain, and compares the optimal results; Section 6 is a numerical analysis; Section 7 summarizes the conclusions of the paper and future research work. Implementing green technological innovation will inevitably increase the production cost of enterprises and pose the risk of failure, which may lead to an unwillingness among enterprises to implement it [32]. erefore, to encourage enterprises to carry out green technological innovation, governments typically adopt subsidy policies
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