Abstract

This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

Highlights

  • In the process of global industrialization, enterprises are faced with a complex social environment, unpredictable market demand, and environmental protection and sustainable development requirements

  • We analyze a version of the model, give the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal carbon-emission-reduction decision for different power structures under various government subsidies, and analyze the influence of a government product subsidy coefficient on the optimal decision results

  • (2) Under different power structures, we analyzed the impacts of the subsidy coefficient and pricing strategy on the performance of green supply chain members and the whole system

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Summary

Introduction

In the process of global industrialization, enterprises are faced with a complex social environment, unpredictable market demand, and environmental protection and sustainable development requirements. For different government subsidies, the low-carbon behavior of consumers affects the operation decision of the supply chain. Considering the low-carbon behavior of consumers, we study product-pricing and carbon-emission problems in a green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer with different government subsidies. We analyze a version of the model, give the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal carbon-emission-reduction decision for different power structures under various government subsidies, and analyze the influence of a government product subsidy coefficient on the optimal decision results. (1) We built different decision models for one manufacturer and one retailer’s green supply chain, studying the pricing and emission-reduction decisions of the supply chain with different power structures under two forms of government subsidies, and analyzed how the subsidy coefficient affects these decisions. (2) Under different power structures, we analyzed the impacts of the subsidy coefficient and pricing strategy on the performance of green supply chain members and the whole system

Supply Chain Decision for Low-Carbon Behavior of Consumers
Supply Chain Decision with Different Government Subsidies
Basic Assumptions
Model Establishment
Model Solution and Analysis
Government Subsidized Manufacturer When Manufacturer Is the Leader
Government Subsidized Manufacturer When Retailer Is the Leader
Government Subsidized Consumers When Manufacturer Is the Leader
Government Subsidized Consumers When Retailer Is the Leader
Comparison of Decision Analysis
Numerical Analysis and Discussion
Conclusions

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