Abstract
The increasing pressures from environmental crises are responsible for the green and sustainable choices made in supply chain management. Green logistics service supply chain (LSSC) operations play a significant role in reducing the environmental burden of the supply chain, and the risk preferences of logistics enterprises lead to more uncertainties in the green management of LSSC. Much research has been limited to case studies of green LSSC, and the different combinations of risk preferences among LSSC participants have generally been ignored. This paper investigates the impact of the risk preference on the equilibrium behavior of an LSSC composed of one logistics service integrator (LSI) and one logistics service provider (LSP) under fuzzy decision environments. Considering the fact that the greening innovation cost and the parameters of the demand function are all characterized as fuzzy variables, the games between the LSI and LSP with different risk preferences were comprehensively proposed under three scenarios. Then, the optimal decisions of the LSP and LSI were drawn, and numerical examples are presented. The results show that an optimistic risk attitude can appropriately improve the greening level, price, and green innovation cost of logistics services, while both risk appetite and risk aversion can lead to an increase in the outsourcing price. Moreover, when the decision maker is risk neutral, the partner’s risk attitude has a significant effect on the value of the decision variables and the cost. Finally, the optimal profits of different risk preference behaviors between the LSI and LSP vary among the game models under fuzzy environments. Subsequently, we obtained three management insights. Total involvement and cooperation among participants were vital factors for an improvement in green management in the LSSC. Additionally, risk preference plays a key role in how LSSC participants make decisions under fuzzy environments. Additionally, a dominant position in the LSSC plays a crucial role in generating profit.
Highlights
With the rapid development of the global economy, there is an increasing awareness of the problems of global warming, environmental deterioration and resource depletion [1,2].Governments have actively worked to develop a green economy and to improve the ecoenvironment [3]
The results showed that the levels of risk attitude of the logistics service integrator (LSI) and logistics service provider (LSP) exist in the form of intervals, and the LSI prefers risk seeking more than the LSP
There were two logistics service supply chain (LSSC) models composed of a risk-neutral LSI acting as the leader and a risk averse or risk appetite LSP acting as the follower under a fuzzy decision environment, and these can be called the pessimistic LSP decision model and the optimistic LSP decision model, respectively
Summary
With the rapid development of the global economy, there is an increasing awareness of the problems of global warming, environmental deterioration and resource depletion [1,2]. Modern logistics services operations play a significant role in reducing the environmental burden of a supply chain [11] This requires all production, distribution, and other associated enterprises in the LSSC to cooperate in order to minimize the adverse impact on the environment. We present seven theoretical game models with different risk preferences and obtain their optimal solutions by solving the maximum profits function of the participants in the LSSC under various scenarios. Given the whole LSSC perspective, this paper explore the effects of green low-carbon activities on logistics, and comprehensively examines the impact of the combination of participants’ risk preferences. We note that total involvement and cooperation among participants are vital factors for the improvement in green management in the LSSC, and risk preference plays a key role in how LSSC participants make decisions under fuzzy environments.
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