Abstract

Abstract At the peak of Guatemala's 36-year civil war (1960-1996), fought between a right-wing authoritarian regime and leftist guerrillas, the army massacred tens of thousands of Maya peasants in a genocidal counterinsurgency. The scorched earth campaign halted the insurgency's momentum, but the army was unable to secure political or military control in the large area of northern lowlands called El Petén. This essay examines how, at this critical juncture, the insurgents and the army embraced distinct environmentalist platforms and land-use policies in order to gain a strategic advantage. It argues that the army won a discursive battle, with assistance from big international conservation NGOs, to claim itself as the only legitimate 'defender of the forests'. This enabled the military to consolidate its position against the insurgents in the northern lowlands, contributing to its de facto victory in the war, as well as fuelling ongoing violence in the postwar.

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