Abstract

This paper investigates green capacity strategies and production volume portfolio for two homogenous firms under emission constraint and demand uncertainty. Each firm utilizes either inflexible capacity or flexible capacity which can postpone production after demand is observed. Results indicate that as the green product becomes more advantaged, flexible capacity advantage weakens and firms prefer inflexible capacity. Firms choose different capacity types when capacity investment costs are close; otherwise, they adopt the cost-advantaged type. A prisoner’s dilemma arises when inflexible capacity is relatively cost-advantaged, which is mitigated by Nash negotiation.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.