Abstract

Green credit is changing industrial structure and corporate behavior, but little attention has been paid to the relationship between green credit and corporate cash management behavior. Based on the typical fact that the allocation of traditional bank credit funds is biased towards heavily polluting industries and the exogenous impact event of green credit policy, this paper takes A-share listed companies in China's capital market from 2008 to 2015 as samples, and uses the DID model to investigate the impact of green credit policy on excess cash holdings of heavily polluting enterprises. The findings indicate that the green credit policy has reduced the excessive cash holdings of heavily polluting enterprises, suggesting that it can correct the issue and align their cash holdings with the requirements of normal production and operations. The mechanism test demonstrates that the green credit policy can alleviate agency conflicts and influence enterprise cash holdings. Moreover, a cross-sectional investigation reveals that the inhibitory effect of the green credit policy on cash holdings is more pronounced in large-scale and state-owned enterprises compared to small-scale and non-state-owned enterprises. Finally, an analysis of the economic consequences reveals that the green credit policy indirectly enhances corporate value by reducing excessive cash holdings. Based on this, banks and financial institutions continue to treat the credit granting of heavily polluting enterprises cautiously, optimize the structure of green financial products, fully consider the different types and nature of customers, and develop differentiated lending conditions and diversified evaluation mechanisms. This paper has enriched the research on the economic consequences of green credit and the influencing factors of corporate cash holdings, and provided policy enlightenment for regulators and listed companies to correctly understand and make full use of green credit policies to keep corporate cash stable through the crisis.

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