Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security Strategy

Abstract

We present the strategic hedging framework as a structural theory of interstate competition. Strategic hedging extends the logic of traditional balance of power theory in order to account for a wider range of foreign policy behavior, while maintaining a strong emphasis on structural incentives that critics found lacking in the soft balancing approach. We provide a four-step identification mechanism that allows the analyst to spot potential cases of strategic hedging and then to filter out behavior that is better categorized as hard balancing, normal diplomatic friction, or simple power maximization. We use the case of Chinese energy security strategy as an illustrative case study and employ the identification mechanism to demonstrate its viability as a strong example of strategic hedging. Given the importance of energy security within the context of Sino-American relations, this paper not only contributes to the development of new structural theory in international relations, it presents a new interpretation of an important policy issue.