Great Power Arms Transfers: Modeling the Decision-Making Processes of Hegemonic, Industrial, and Restrictive Exporters

Abstract

This paper develops and tests a fuzzy multi-criteria model of arms transfer decision-making. The model is adapted to SIPRI's three main arms export patterns-hegemonic, industrial, and restrictive-and tested for its ability to predict the arms transfer strategies of the United States, France, and West Germany for importers of the Third World during the years 19501976. Ninety strategies are predicted, with an overall success rate of 87%. The model outperforms several naive models (including an autoregressive model) and an expected-utility model. The multi-criteria versus expectedutility tests center on the U.S.'s hegemonic pattern and indicate that the strategies chosen by the U.S. for importers of Central America were guided by geostrategic and regional stability considerations. Other analyses reveal that the differences between the success rates of the multi-criteria submodels (one submodel per exporter) are not statistically significant and that the best predictor for an exporter is the submodel prepared specifically for that exporter. It has been almost two decades since the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published its pathbreaking study of arms transfers. The Arms Trade with the Third World (1971), was then and certainly remains today the most comprehensive account of the motivations and practices of countries that deliver and receive arms. It also represents one of the earliest attempts to theorize, if ever so modestly, about the arms transfer phenomenon. Of particular relevance, in this respect, is SIPRI's designation of three general arms export patterns based on what the researchers believe are the main goals of various exporting states. These are the industrial pattern, which pertains to countries that deliver weapons either for profit or to support their arms industries; the restrictive pattern, which indicates the practice of exporting arms only when such deliveries improve the chances of regional stability and reduce the chances of regional conflict; and the hegemonic pattern, which describes countries that supply arms in order to improve their political and strategic positions in the import region. This simple classification scheme is the focal point of the present study. The objective here is to build upon recent formal and empirical analyses of hegemonic Author's note: Earlier versions of this paper were presented before the annual meetings of the International Studies Association (1988, St. Louis) and the Midwest Political Science Association (1989, Chicago). The author wishes to thank three anonymous referees and the editors of ISQ for their helpful comments.