Abstract
The article investigates the extent of political favouritism in the central financing of local governments in Hungary between 2015 and 2018. An investigation of various transfers and the role of both mayor and member of parliament (MP) in the granting of funds enabled me to map how grant schemes relate to pork-barrelling. The rewarding of core supporters is observable with regard to discretionary intergovernmental transfers, while the political alignment affects the distribution of EU funds; thus, these constitute the primary mechanisms for acknowledging and sharing credit with local leaders. When a grant scheme requires municipalities to file an application for funding, local governments in opposition receive fewer grants.
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