Grain Embargo as Diplomatic Lever: Fulcrum or Folly?

Abstract

Xoland provides the setting for a potentially major confrontation between the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the situation in Poland has already sparked serious dispute not only between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between the United States and its West European allies as they consider responses to the apparent Soviet influence over Polish affairs. Among the most frequently mentioned possible measures that the United States and its allies might take against the Soviet Union to protest its involvement in Poland is a reinstatement of the grain embargo of 1980—81. Is another grain embargo ofthe Soviet Union likely? Is a grain embargo, in fact, a potent tool of foreign policy? Based on the lessons of the 1980-81 experience, could another grain embargo have a significant economic and political impact on the Soviets? This paper attempts to answer these questions by examining the decision-making process that led to the 1980-81 embargo, assessing the effects of the embargo—on the United States as well as on the U.S.S.R.—and, from that examination, drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of the grain embargo as a foreign policy tool. Because of the dearth of literature on the embargo decision-making process, the author interviewed many of those involved in the decision, including National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland, a number of sub-CabJohn C. Roney is a candidate for the M.I.P.P. (Master in International Public Policy) degree at SAIS. He is on leave from his position as Information Director ofthe U.S. Department ofAgriculture's World Agricultural Outlook Board. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Agriculture or of the United States government.