GPS Spoofing Detection in UAV Using Motion Processing Unit

Abstract

To facilitate navigation and tracking, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) or drones rely on the global positioning system (GPS). Still, unmanned aerial vehicles are resistless to GPS spoofing attacks, which involve manipulating GPS module receivers by transmitting altered signals. For example, an adversary using an adverse GPS simulator could broadcast counterfeit GPS signals, causing a GPS-reliant UAV to deviate from its intended flight path. This can result in loss of position accuracy and potentially cause a crash or unauthorized access to restricted areas. To mitigate this issue, several approaches have been advocated to detect GPS spoofing attacks. Motion Processing Units (MPUs) have emerged as a promising option, as they can provide precise measurements of the UAVs orientation and movement, enabling the mitigation and detection of spoofing attacks on GPS signals. In this study, a technique is introduced for identifying and counteracting GPS spoofing attacks in drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) using data from the MPU9250. The approach employs data from the accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer along all three axes to detect instances of GPS spoofing and recover accurate GPS coordinates. Any noteworthy divergence in the gyroscope readings is considered as a possible GPS spoofing attack. To evaluate the efficacy of the propounded method, it is tested using real-world experiments, which demonstrate its capability to successfully detect falsified GPS signals.