GPS spoofer countermeasure effectiveness based on signal strength, noise power, and C/N0 measurements

Abstract

SUMMARYSpoofing sources can effectively disrupt a GPS receiver during the acquisition phase by generating multiple false correlation peaks and increasing the noise floor. Such deceptive correlation peaks can mislead the GPS receiver into acquiring the spoofer generated signals rather than the authentic signals. Also, the spoofer can increase the receiver noise floor to bury the authentic signals in the noise and at the same time generate correlation peaks with amplitudes commensurate with reasonable C/N0 expectations. The main focus of this paper is on assessment of the reduced effectiveness of the GPS spoofer countermeasure during acquisition where the GPS receiver utilizes C/N0 discrimination. As shown, whereas the C/N0 discrimination is of limited effectiveness, with a modest circuit modification, the receiver can measure the absolute power of the correlation peaks, which is an effective means of detecting and discriminating spoofer sources. It will be shown that employing absolute power monitoring technique considerably reduces the vulnerability region of the receiver compared with the C/N0 monitoring techniques. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.