Governments Playing Games and Combating the Dynamics of a Terrorist Organization

Abstract

Multiple governments are modeled as intervening through time and selectively against terrorism sponsors and a terrorist organization’s three labor stocks, i.e., ideologues, criminal mercenaries, and captive participants. The three labor stocks and sponsors are modeled with four differential time equations. Differential equations and game theory are combined in interesting ways. The governments play games with each other on how to intervene. Depending on the unit intervention cost from high to low, the paper shows how governments may refrain from intervening, may free ride on each other in a prisoner’s dilemma, may intervene as in the chicken game, may intervene unilaterally, may coordinate between multiple equilibria, and may intervene jointly. Mixed strategies are analyzed for governments preferring to create uncertainty, or decrease the uncertainty, for example, when playing the chicken game. Intervention may successfully curtail or terminate the terrorist organization over various time horizons, or may fail to do so causing unbounded growth. This paper provides a tool for decision and policy makers to understand the evolution and composition of a terrorist organization through time depending on intervention.