Government Support's signaling effect on credit financing for new-energy enterprises

Abstract

For new-energy enterprises, obtaining government support, which acts as a signal to the bank, has gradually become an important way for companies to obtain credit. Using information content measurement, this study identified the signaling effects and calculated the signaling effect strength of government support for the credit financing of new-energy companies. We then analyzed the information content of policy signals using regression methods. The main conclusions are as follows. R&D subsidies have a certification effect, mainly certifying the technical capabilities of enterprises. New-energy production subsidies have an anticertification effect on many new-energy firms, and they cannot convey any information to the bank. Tax incentives also have a certification effect, and the information they convey is low rent-seeking. High political connection is not positive information of government supports for new-energy firms to obtain bank loans. This research can help policy makers analyze the effects of their policy tools on the decision-making of financial market entities.