Abstract
A game theoretic model is developed where a government protects against a terrorist seeking terrorism and criminal objectives. A terrorist can recruit a benefactor providing funds by remaining ideologically pure, or may resort to crime. The model accounts for the players’ resources, unit costs of effort, unit benefit and valuations and contest intensities for terrorist and crime objectives. We determine and quantify how these factors and the government impact a terrorist’s terrorism and crime efforts and relative ideological orientation on a continuum from being highly ideological to being highly criminal. We also consider how the terrorist group is impacted by support of benefactor(s), the central authority’s ability to impose greater sanctions for terrorist activities compared to criminal actions and the ideological orientation of the group’s leadership. We discuss insights from the model and consider a few historical perspectives.
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