Government mechanism in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling among prospect theory and evolutionary game theory

Abstract

Improper disposal of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) poses challenges for resource loss and public environmental pollution. Government policies are required to regulate WEEE recycling. To better explore the governance mechanism in the WEEE recycling network, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the government, recyclers, and manufacturers under bounded rationality and uncertainty was established using evolutionary game theory and prospect theory by underscoring the WEEE processing fee (WPF) exemption to adjust the behaviour of the WEEE recycling network participants. The research found that nine equilibrium points and eight possible ESSs exist and that the evolutionary stability strategies of tripartite decisions mainly depend on the trade-off between costs and revenues. Through numerical simulations, it was observed that the psychological perception of risk for recyclers and manufacturers can affect the behaviour and strategies of WEEE recycling stakeholders in uncertain environments. As WEEE recycling stakeholders increase their pursuit of safety risks, both recyclers’ and manufacturers’ willingness to engage in green behaviour is increasing. In addition, under the WPF exemption, the government can achieve the goal of encourage recyclers and manufacturers to choose green behaviour at a relatively low cost. We suggest that the government should strive to establish a stable WEEE recycling environment, establish an appropriate WPF exemption mechanism, and fully consider the cross-impact of recyclers and manufacturers to promote the green behaviour and efficiency of WEEE recycling.