Government Incentives, Top Management Turnover and Accounting Information: Evidence from China's Soes

Abstract

This paper investigates control mechanism and accounting information used for control mechanism, shaped by government incentives for business. Using a sample of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, it finds that the likelihood of top management turnover in China's SOEs, which is an important aspect of corporate control mechanism, is inversely associated with two types of accounting information of firm performance, firm-specific accounting performance and relative accounting performance, which is induced by the interests of Chinese government for the economic performance and political competition. Further, this paper finds that relative accounting performance, especially regional relative accounting performance, receives more weight in turnover decisions if a SOE is a local monopolistic firm or in local monopoly, because relative performance measure could offer a relatively simple benchmark for local government to assess manager's quality and provide stronger incentive scheme in China's political environment. By seeking deeper understanding into government incentives, the findings imply that induced by government incentives, effective corporate governance which is based on distinguished characteristics of accounting information exists in an economy highly involved by government.