Government environmental regulation strategy for new pollutants control in mariculture

Abstract

The control of new pollutants in mariculture is a marine environmental policy direction. This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model containing fishermen, sales platforms and government to analyze government environmental regulation strategy for new pollutants in mariculture, then conduct numerical simulations based on survey data. The research conclusions are as follows. (1) As the probability of government regulation on mariculture's new pollutants increases, the probability of fishermen engaging in green mariculture and the platform purchasing green mariculture products both increases. (2) There is a role boundary of government mariculture green subsidies. As the total amount of mariculture green subsidies increases beyond a certain amount, its marginal incentive effect diminishes and the government will gradually stop providing mariculture green subsidies. (3) Government penalties can promote the control of new pollutants in mariculture. With the increase of penalties for new pollutants in mariculture, fishermen will gradually choose green farming and sales platforms will purchase green mariculture products. The conclusions will provide theoretical and practical guidelines for new pollutants control and government regulatory strategy in mariculture.