Government-Enterprise Collusion and the Effectiveness of Environmental Regulations: Implications for Public Health.

Abstract

Effective environmental management will create a win-win situation for building an ecological civilization with the potential to control the COVID-19 pandemic. From the perspective of government-enterprise collusion (GEC), this study analyzes the moderating effects of the officials' promotion incentives and turnover on the effectiveness of environmental regulations utilizing a panel dataset on 276 cities in China from 2003 to 2019. The study reveals the following empirical results: First, promotion incentives positively moderate the relationship between environmental regulations and environmental pollution, mainly air pollution; results for water pollution are not significant. Compared with general cities, the positive moderating effect of promotion incentives in high-level cities is weaker and the negative moderating effect is more potent. Additionally, the moderating effect of promotion incentives is predominantly positive in the new developmental stage from 2013 to 2019. Second, the negative moderating effect of officials' turnover on the effectiveness of environmental regulations is mainly observed for water pollution but not evident for air pollution. Compared with high-level cities, officials' turnover in general cities is more conducive to the effectiveness of environmental regulations. These findings provide beneficial insights for promoting green growth by improving official governance and destroying GEC.