Government by Dissent: Protest, Resistance, and Radical Democratic Thought in the Early American Republic by Robert W. T. Martin (review)

Abstract

Government by Dissent: Protest, Resistance, and Radical Democratic Thought in Early American Republic. By Robert W. T. Martin. (New York: New York University Press, 2013. Pp. xi + 262. Cloth, $49.00.)Reviewed by Matthew Rainbow HaleAccording political theorist Robert W. T. Martin, Lockean consent gets all attention, yet dissent is equally important democracy. It is important not because dissenters usually obtain what they want, but rather because it oblige [s] people rethink their views (3). Although dissent encompasses idea of the opposition, it is simple opposition in that it need not be, and occasionally is not, unquestioningly loyal (3). In end, Martin's primary goal-one that he, for most part, achieves-is chart late-eighteenth-century emergence and contours of theories of dissentient democracy, of political propositions that justify dissent as a necessary, beneficial component of democratic life.Martin's chapter argues that rough music (enforcement of communal norms through ritualistic intimidation and violence), quasilegitimate populist disorder, and backcountry regulation were increasingly de-legitimized in late eighteenth centuiy. Considering persistence-or better yet, democratic apotheosis-of mobs in nineteenth centuiy, Martin's assertion that movement that sought justify notion of popular nullification as a more democratic instrument than mere was unsuccessful is overstated (53). Still, idea that various supporters of extra-legal versions of protest were put in an awkward position by elites' insistence that founding of a representative republic rendered unnecessary resort populist disorder is spot-on. For example, author astutely demonstrates that William Findley struggled respond attacks on Whiskey Rebellion and ultimately tried to navigate a middle course between people's active insistence on their rights and actual resistance an elected government (42). Martin thus buttresses work of scholars Todd Estes and Seth Cotlar, both of whom usefully highlight rhetorical and political potency of conservative efforts channel expression of popular into elections alone (52).1If intensified criticism caused some persons defend uncomfortably role of extra-legal populist disorder, Federalist-Antifederalist debate, author claims, occasioned first effort conceptualize and practice a ''democratic dissent' (57). Once again, author overstates things; examples provided in Chapter 3 point haphazardness rather than a sustained attempt theorize democratic dissent. Nevertheless, there is good reason view Federalist-Antifederalist controversy as an important moment in development of dissentient democracy notions. For one thing, Martin shows, anonymous author of pamphlet Candid Considerations on Libels (1789) suggested that contestation can encourage genius (77). John Francis Mercer went even further by advocating for institutions of public education that will empower dissenting voices (77). Innovative as these arguments were, there were limits. No one asked question of whether dissent is productive when it is false and Antifederalists' ingrained belief in unity and timelessness of truth precluded possibility of multiple political truths in a diverse country (81).Even before Federalist-Antifederalist debate, James Madison began conceptualizing public opinion as a beneficial dissenting force. As Martin explains, Madison's and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments (1785) struck a blow not only for liberty of conscience but also for idea that the public's power of elective representation cannot be crux of popular sovereignty (122). In this regard, author's comparison of Madison's Memorial with contemporaneous religious liberty petitions in Virginia is particularly instinctive. …