Governing nuclear safety in Japan after the Fukushima nuclear accident: incremental or radical change?

Abstract

Official Japanese reports into the causes of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident identified significant weaknesses in the country’s structures and systems for governing nuclear safety. As a result, the government undertook a number of legal and structural reforms. One of the most important was to establish a Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) in 2012 and grant it a high degree of independence and authority. Despite scepticism at the time over the likely effectiveness of this new agency, the NRA has taken a robust approach to permitting restarts after all nuclear reactors were shut down following the accident. This style of safety regulation owes much to the personality of the NRA Chairman and has been criticised as being unpredictable and overly strict. In late 2019, only 8 GWe of capacity was operating out of a pre-accident total of 48 GWe. As a result, the current government’s preference that nuclear power provide a significant, though gradually declining share of the energy mix is under threat. In institutional terminology, Japan’s nuclear power industry is at a juncture that could become critical, but the outcome is unpredictable at present. The rapid demise of the nuclear industry is quite possible, but a range of political and economic interests may prevent this. Much will depend on the actions of the next government.