Governance or reputation? Flexible tax enforcement and excess goodwill: Evidence from the taxpaying credit rating system in China

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of flexible tax enforcement on firms’ excess goodwill using unique manually collected data on taxpaying credit rating in China from 2014 to 2021. We document that A-rated taxpayer firms have less excess goodwill; A-rated firms reduce excess goodwill by 0.005 vis-a-vis non-A-rated firms, which accounts for 100% of the mean value of excess goodwill. This finding holds after multiple robustness tests and an endogeneity analysis. Moreover, this negative effect is more pronounced in firms with low information transparency, that are non-state-owned and that are located in regions with low tax enforcement intensity. The channel test results suggest that taxpaying credit rating system as flexible tax enforcement reduces firms’ excess goodwill through a reputation-based effect and not a governance-based effect. This study reveals that the taxpaying credit rating system in China as flexible tax enforcement can bring halo effect to A rating firms, thereby limiting irrational M&As and breaking goodwill bubble.