Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to examine the effect of governance mechanisms (board size, board independence, duality, the Sharia board size, Sharia board meetings and ownership concentration) on the performance of insurance providers of distinguishable Muamalah contracts (wakalah and hybrid), moderated by the length of senior leaders’ servicing time. Design/methodology/approach The full sample includes 21 listed Takaful companies divided into two subsamples – 12 insurance wakalah contracts offered in the South East Asian (SEA) countries and 9 insurance hybrid contracts offered in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period of 2012–2018. The methodology is informed by Baron and Kenny’s (1986) moderation process approach. Findings The results of this study indicate that the larger the size of directors’ board and the higher the number of outside directors, the greater the SEA wakalah Takaful insurance performance. Nondual functions and a larger size of Sharia board along with a highly-concentrated ownership structure have a positive effect on the Takaful insurance performance in both the SEA and GCC regions. Furthermore, the higher the Sharia board meetings, the higher performance of all types of Takaful insurance providers in the sample. As for the moderating effect of the director’s seniority, it is found to negatively moderate the relationship between the governance mechanisms and the Takaful performance in both regions. Originality/value This paper highlights that the leader’s entrenchment stands as an obstructing factor impeding the governance mechanisms from enhancing Takaful performance. Thus, it serves to contribute to clearly understanding the appropriate governance mechanisms usefully fit for a Takaful insurance effective performance, applying the wakalah and hybrid contract types. Such a contribution should be appreciated by the concerned regulators engaged in setting up limited serving periods for the directors whereby the Takaful insurance practice could be efficiently managed and supervised.
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