Governance in the UN System: A configurational analysis of board designs for effective monitoring

Abstract

How is the United Nations (UN) governed to perform effectively? The UN is established by state actors to promote international cooperation to deliver global public goods. The UN has several specialized agencies, funds, and programs–which are independent intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) forming the UN system– with different missions for a vast array of stakeholders spanning across transnational borders. IGOs under the UN system have different levels of effectiveness in fulfilling their mandates. One key governance mechanism for IGOs to be effective in pursuing their mandates is monitoring by the board of directors. Indeed, all IGOs under the UN system have boards that are expected to perform the monitoring function. Yet, almost no research on IGO boards has been produced up to date. Moreover, none has looked at the effectiveness of IGO boards in monitoring. In this study, we explore the board designs of IGOs under the UN System, and analyze how these board designs are highly effective or perceived as highly effective in monitoring. Results show that certain archetypes of IGOs have different board designs that are highly effective or perceived as highly effective in monitoring. And there are also multiple board designs that are less effective or perceived as less effective in monitoring. We find that board designs correspond to the interplay of organizational complexity and extent of distribution problem in IGOs to facilitate effective monitoring in these organizations.