Governance beyond the ballot: Norms, populism, and post-election preferences

Abstract

Governance beyond the ballot: Norms, populism, and post-election preferences In this article, Mariken A.C.G. van der Velden, Professor of Political Communication at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, explores citizens’ preferences for government formation. When comparing proportional voting systems with majoritarian ones, scholars often highlight that the former frequently yield inconclusive election outcomes, wherein politicians, rather than voters, determine the composition of the governing parties. In multiparty democracies, post- election discussions among parties with divergent preferences generally lead to the necessity of compromising on a shared coalition agreement to establish a government. Nevertheless, due to the compromises inherent in coalitions, some critics may label them as undemocratic. In the present day, both analysts and academics acknowledge prolonged delays in the establishment of coalition governments within Europe. For example, the 2021 Dutch election triggered an unprecedentedly protracted government negotiation process, culminating in a government that collapsed after eighteen months.