Governance and strategy of entrepreneurial networks: an introduction

Josef Windsperger,Gerard Cliquet,Thomas Ehrmann,George W J Hendrikse

doi:10.1007/s11187-017-9888-0

Abstract

This special issue focuses on empirical and theoretical papers that help us to better understand the strategy and governance of entrepreneurial networks, such as franchise chains, alliances, and cooperative networks. The following central themes are covered: (I) Which formal governance mechanisms do entrepreneurial networks use in order to reduce transaction cost/agency cost and to increase strategic value? (II) What is the role of relational governance mechanisms (such as information exchange and social ties) for the performance outcomes in franchise chains and cooperatives? (III) Which alliance strategies do entrepreneurial firms pursue to realize a competitive advantage, and what is the impact of resources and capabilities on performance outcomes of entrepreneurial firms. To address these issues, insights from organizational economics (transaction cost theory, agency theory, signaling theory), strategic management perspectives (resource-based, knowledge-based and organizational capabilities theory), entrepreneurship theory and the relational governance view are used.

Highlights

The studies address the following themes: First, which formal governance mechanisms do franchise networks use for transaction cost/agency cost savings and strategic value creation? Formal governance mechanisms refer to the structure of decision and ownership rights and the contract design
What is the role of relational governance mechanisms for the performance in franchise networks and cooperatives? Applying insights from organizational economics and the relational governance view (e.g., Dyer 1997; Dyer and Singh 1998) the papers focus on the following issues: quality signaling and voluntary information disclosure in franchising and the value of pooling in cooperative entrepreneurial networks (Liang and Hendrikse 2016)
Research results based on insights from resourcebased, knowledge-based and organizational capabilities theories (e.g., Barney 1991; Teece et al 1997; Das and Teng 2000; Alvarez and Barney 2001; Lavie 2006; Teece 2014; Scholten et al 2015) and entrepreneurship theory (e.g., Hébert and Link 1989; Audretsch 2012; Carlsson et al 2013; Hayter 2015) are used to address the following issues: peer networking strategy and franchisee performance, alliance strategy and innovation performance of spin-off firms, impact of network and managerial capabilities on the performance of entrepreneurial firms, and the role of partner resources in strategic equity alliances for smaller entrepreneurial firm compared to larger firms

Summary

Introduction

What is the role of relational governance mechanisms (such as information disclosure, signaling and social ties) for the performance in franchise networks and cooperatives? Applying insights from organizational economics (transaction cost theory, signaling theory, e.g., Gallini and Lutz 1992; Spence 2002) and the relational governance view (e.g., Dyer 1997; Dyer and Singh 1998) the papers focus on the following issues: quality signaling and voluntary information disclosure in franchising and the value of pooling in cooperative entrepreneurial networks (Liang and Hendrikse 2016).

Results

Conclusion