Gorbachev's Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War by Andrei Grachev (review)

Abstract

782 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO hypotheses and concepts.What Ogushi omitsis the impactof the wider politicalchangesthatoccurredbetween1988and 1991.He mentions events suchas theelectionsof 1989and 1990but does notconsiderin any depth whatinfluence theyhad on theCPSU and itscadres,or try tomeasurewhat influence theyhad on the end of the USSR so as to estimatethe role of partycollapseindependently ofthem.It is clear thatinternal partyconflict and confusion werenecessary conditions forSovietsystemic failure but not thatthey weresufficient to cause thesystemic failure or eventhedispersal of powerthatprecededit.A knock-on effect ofthisisthatOgushidoesnotmake a completely convincingcase that lookingat the party'sorganizational problems helpsus to evaluateideas about Sovietcollapsesuchas mightbe derivedfrommodernization theoryor transitology. This latterproblemis exacerbated bythevery reductive approachthatOgushiuseswhensummarizingarguments made by institutionalists, modernization theorists and transitologists , and the simplification of conceptsused to supporthis argument. The hypotheses hededucesfrom themaintheoretical positions hetests against theparty's collapseareverycrudedistillations ofthearguments theseschools present. A similar problemariseswhennewconcepts areintroduced throughout thebook: generally theyare not well definedor thoroughly discussed. Ogushi'suseofpraetorianism inthechapter on theAugust coup,forexample, is a verysimplerendition of the originalHuntingtonian idea: Huntington talkedofat leastfourtypesofpraetorianism but Ogushiuses it straightforwardlyas beliefin theneed formilitary /policerule.In a shortbook (some 167pagesofactualtext)somemoretimespenton conceptualand hypothesis definition wouldnothave gone amissand mighthave helpedto strengthen thepurchaseoftheanalysis moregenerally. The theoretical partsof Ogushi'sbook are thusnot as successful as the empirical description ofpartyreorganization, elections to the28thCongress andfinancial decline.Stillhisbookisa detailedcontribution on thesefeatures oflateCommunist ruleand willbe ofgreatuse to specialists forthatreason and forthelight thatitthrows on thelaterstagesofGorbachev's reforms and thecentrality oftheCPSU to their failure. Department ofPolitics andPublicAdministration University ofLimerick Neil Robinson Grachev, Andrei. Gorbachev's Gamble:Soviet Foreign Policyand theEnd oftheCold War.PolityPress,Cambridgeand Maiden, MA, 2008. xiii + 271pp. Notes.Bibliography. Index.£20.00. Andrei Grachev, who workedon foreign policyin MikhailGorbachev's team,offers an insider's viewofthetwists and turns ofitsmaking. He setsout to contribute whathe dubs'a morestereoscopic image'(p. 8) bydrawing on thetestimonies ofotherinsiders, keyfunctionaries and politicalplayers.His bookis a hugely welcomeadditionto theliterature drawing on theviewsof thosein theparty, ministries, military, secret policeand academia,as wellas on theopinionsofforeign leaders. REVIEWS 783 His thesisis thatto graspthe development of the 'new thinking' it is essential to 'explorethepoliticaland intellectual "soil" from whichit arose' (p. 9). Advocating this, however, he seemsunawarethatmanyscholars inthe fieldsof international relationsand politicalsciencehave arguedforsome decadesthatitisvitaltoexaminetheperceptions andviewswithin theleadershipsofstatesforin -depth understandings offoreign and domesticpolicies. His advantagehereis thathe was closerto keyplayersthanmostWestern academicscouldget. Grachev understandsthe historyof Soviet foreignpolicy as one of 'innateduplicity' as itstruggled on a contradictory 'doubletrack' ofsupporting 'revolutionary forces', yetwitha 'questforstability' (p. 10).The Ministry of ForeignAffairs soughttheformer, whilsttheCentralCommittee's InternationalDepartmentwas supposedto seek the latter,thusoftencompeting witheach other.GrachevdepictsSovietleadersas the 'prisoners'of this 'dual track', (p. 12).He charges thatthe'1941syndrome' - an obsession with security - contributed to a 'paranoiepolicy'whichwrought havoc on the Sovieteconomy.He blamesthe'Gromyko-Ustinov alliance'fora 'hawkish' approach(p. 18). Grachev'soverview ofthe 'moles'in powerand the 'alternative political culture'(p. 25) makes compellingreading,althoughsome historians may questionquitehow apt is hiscomparison ofthereformers ofthe 1980swith theDecembrists of 1825.His coverageofthecracksin themonolith reveals muchabout therolesofkeydiplomatssuch as ValentinFalin and Anatoli Kovalev and indeed tales of Falin's rolesand his sidelining over German unity weave through thebook. Grachevalso exploresdifferent viewswithin themilitary concerning strategic nuclearbuild-upand negotiating positions withtheUSA and thecomplexities ofwithdrawal from Afghanistan. Gorbachev's rise,achievements and demisearetreated sympathetically and thesignificance ofhistrips to theWestcarefully analysedforthedifferences theymade to his leadershipand to the USSR. From 1983 Gorbachevis portrayed as a man obsessed,in the words of AleksandrIakovlev,with theneed for'necessary internal change' (p. 45). Grachevsketches theroles playedbyEnricoBerlinguer, MargaretThatcherand FrançoisMitterrand in Gorbachev'sforeign tripsin 1984and how theycontributed to his'preparation 'forthefield offoreign affairs. He insists thatGromyko's 'heavypresence' (p. 54)limited Gorbachev'searlyability to actdecisively and AnatoliiCherniaev (a regularsourceofquotation)initially feltthatGorbachevlacked'any clearidea' ofhowtheUSSR couldattain worldstandards (p.54).Gorbachev's important 'peace offensive' isgivenappropriate commendation as arehisdeft and often difficult manoeuvres to builda newteam. Grachevseesperestroika as a 'universal lever'oftransformation and notes thatIakovlevbelievedittobe a 'universal humanitarian ideology' or 'political religion' (pp.74-75).He takesus through successive summits and their failures and achievements fromReykjavikto Malta, looks at radical changes at homeand inEasternEurope,and discusses theendoftheCold War and the finalimplosion oftheUSSR. The sourcesare wideand thequotations vivid, addinga feeloftheperiodas wellas appreciation ofthevariedperceptions and interpretations thatcirculated amongreformers, conservatives and their 784 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO changing positions. The fateof Eduard Shevardnadzeas ForeignMinister, forinstance, and thecomplications to hisrolecausedbyEvgeniiPrimakov's actions during Iraq'sattack onKuwaitandShevardnadze's belief that...