Gorbachev's Difficult Time in the Gulf

Abstract

Mikhail Gorbachev's political for foreign policy was tested and stretched to its limits in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis; it may have been stretched beyond its limits. New thinking posited a world of interdependent states and, therefore, international relations devoid of ideology, East-West competition, and the zero-sum game approach characteristic of the cold war. These ideas dictated Soviet behavior in the early stages of the Gulf crisis, which began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. A second period could be discerned, however, as a result of the singular increase in the influence of conservatives from the Soviet military, KGB, and Communist party in Moscow. The power of these groups was felt primarily in domestic affairs, most blatantly with regard to the nationalities issue; but it was gathering in the area of foreign policy, as demonstrated by the difficult juggling act undertaken by Gorbachev as the Gulf war progressed. Moscow's initial behavior following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was entirely in keeping with the new thinking. Intent upon demonstrating that the Soviet Union was serious about belonging to the world community of responsible, law-abiding, and cooperative nations, the Soviet leadership left the old ideological and zero-sum game considerations well behind and joined the American-led