Abstract
Both robots and humans can behave in ways that engender positive and negative evaluations of their behaviors and associated responsibility. However, extant scholarship on the link between agent evaluations and valenced behavior has generally treated moral behavior as a monolithic phenomenon and largely focused on moral deviations. In contrast, contemporary moral psychology increasingly considers moral judgments to unfold in relation to a number of moral foundations (care, fairness, authority, loyalty, purity, liberty) subject to both upholding and deviation. The present investigation seeks to discover whether social judgments of humans and robots emerge differently as a function of moral foundation-specific behaviors. This work is conducted in two studies: (1) an online survey in which agents deliver observed/mediated responses to moral dilemmas and (2) a smaller laboratory-based replication with agents delivering interactive/live responses. In each study, participants evaluate the goodness of and blame for six foundation-specific behaviors, and evaluate the agent for perceived mind, morality, and trust. Across these studies, results suggest that (a) moral judgments of behavior may be agent-agnostic, (b) all moral foundations may contribute to social evaluations of agents, and (c) physical presence and agent class contribute to the assignment of responsibility for behaviors. Findings are interpreted to suggest that bad behaviors denote bad actors, broadly, but machines bear a greater burden to behave morally, regardless of their credit- or blame-worthiness in a situation.
Highlights
Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robots” [1] govern fictional robots’ behaviors, and these laws persist in contemporary imaginaries about how robots should behave: do not injure humans, obey humans, engage in self-protection
This study seeks to build on current understandings of how social judgments are impact by robots’moral behaviors by assessing (a) how attributions of behavioral goodness and responsibility may vary by moral foundation and (b) whether foundation-specific attributions may differentially contribute to social evaluations of robots
When people interacted with the agent in person, moral valence of behaviors influenced perceived agent responsibility: upholding garners lower responsibility while violating garners higher responsibility. (RQ2) most discrete-foundation evaluations played a role in evaluations of mind, morality, and trust evaluations—in live interactions, loyalty behaviors had no influence on social evaluations of either agent
Summary
Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robots” [1] govern fictional robots’ behaviors, and these laws persist in contemporary imaginaries about how robots should behave: do not injure humans, obey humans, engage in self-protection. Current human–robot interaction scholarship generally engages morality as holistic “goodness” or “badness” or reduces it to singular exemplars; this contrasts with contemporary moral psychology’s increasing engagement of the construct as mul-. This study seeks to build on current understandings of how social judgments are impact by robots’ (im)moral behaviors by assessing (a) how attributions of behavioral goodness and responsibility may vary by moral foundation and (b) whether foundation-specific attributions may differentially contribute to social evaluations of robots. Two studies (an online survey and a laboratory replication) indicate that judgments of (im)moral behavior may be agent-agnostic and that all moral foundations contribute to behavior and agent evaluations. Physical presence and agent type play a role assignment of responsibility for those behaviors
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
