Good Revolutions Gone Bad

Abstract

(ProQuest: ... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted.)INTRODUCTION: PHILOSOPHY IS REVOLUTIONARY POLITICSWhat unites Zizek's and Heidegger's philosophy is also what sets them apart: revolution. For both, the total transformation of human being is at the same time an empirical necessity (because of the state the world is in) and a theoretical possibility (because of their philosophical anthropology and ontology). The most succinct summary of the common theoretical position leading to political engagement comes from Zizek himself. In Zizek's view, Heidegger ontologises Kant's epistemological turn that recognised the finitude and limits of human knowledge. The ontologisation of finitude can be described in many ways. One is by saying that for Heidegger temporality (historicity) is not a deficient mode of eternity, but the other way around.1 Therefore, as Zizek writes:Heidegger's ontology is in fact 'political' . . . : his endeavour to . . . assert as the key . . . man's decision to adopt a 'project' by means of which he actively assumes his 'thrownness' into a finite historical situation, locates the historico-political act of decision in the very heart of ontology itself.2Zizek most emphatically agrees with this definition of the political as an ontologically basic category, leading to an attitude of fully assuming the consequences of the of ontological guarantee.3 Consequently, both Heidegger and Zizek see truth as non-neutral and non-harmonious, as partisan and kampferisch.However, the commitment to revolution does not yet decide the content of politics. Where Heidegger parts ways with almost everybody is in insisting-even after the war-that the Nazi movement had the right potential. Zizek, too, thinks that a revolution, the October revolution, which went terribly wrong and produced large scale mass murder, had the right potential. Indeed, Zizek wants to present a very precise corrective move with regard to Heidegger's philosophy. He wants to follow Heidegger to the where revolution is grounded in the historicity and finitude of Being, so that political commitment becomes one with thought, and personal life is submitted to sacrifice and leadership, but not to the where a concrete Nazi twist is given to the commitment. Furthermore, he wants to present a theoretical antidote to the wrong twist. The antidote is the concept of a universal, ahistorical subject. The concept of the subject is also connected to Zizek's motivation for a leftist revolution, so the rehabilitation of the subject is not a provocative quirk, but rather the crucial quilting point of Zizek's philosophy, connecting the overall ontology and the particular, communist political content.Consequently, if we do not want to participate in the rehabilitation of the subject, we have to respond to Heidegger's revolution in a way that does not necessitate the subject. This, at the same time, reduces the need for the rehabilitation. Schematically, we follow Zizek in accepting Heidegger's ontologised politics but part ways in suggesting-through a critique of Zizek's interpretation of Heidegger-a corrective that is asubjectivist, rather than subjectivist. This, in turn, necessitates that we identify the problems of Heidegger's Nazism in a more realistic way than, for instance, Zizek does, and, at the same time, accept the lack of ontological guarantees also with respect to revolutions: they can go horribly wrong and no amount of theory is going to preclude that possibility.ZIZEK ON HEIDEGGER'S NAZISMThe main upshot of Zizek's interpretation of Heidegger's Nazism, most elaborately presented in the long essay Why Heidegger Made the Right Step in 1933,4 is that contrary to the commonly held view, Heidegger's political activism was not an out-and-out mistake, but almost right. What was right was taking the step into everyday politics, making the connection between philosophy and concrete collective activism. …