Abstract

As North America has become more integrated through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States and Mexico have an increasingly common interest in security issues. The question posed by this article is why is this relationship largely informal despite their shared border, strong economic connections and a fair amount of convergence on security issues? We address this question using both a strategic choice approach and a constructivist analysis. Using these approaches, we find that power asymmetry, a history of distrust, and a lack of common identity contribute to the ineffectiveness of implementing an effective joint security policy. Both approaches would suggest that developing a stronger institutional framework would mitigate coordination problems and enhance the potential for a more effective security arrangement. The lack of political will on both sides, as well as mutual distrust, however, make this an unlikely prospect in the foreseeable future.

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