Good governance, institutions and performance of public private partnerships

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore theoretically and empirically which institutional factors (including good governance ones) help public-private partnerships (PPP) in providing better infrastructural services, which would then in their turn lead to attracting more private investment for the whole economy. Design/methodology/approach – On the theoretical level, while a focus is put on discussing the institutions that should be responsible for PPP success, reconciliation is being attempted between institutional economics from one side and the new public management and networks management perspectives from the other. Empirically, OLS multivariate panel regressions test the suggestions of the theoretical discussion with emphasis on interaction terms between PPP and the studied institutions. Findings – Evidence is found that good governance institutions, and specifically good regulatory quality, bureaucratic efficiency and independence, help PPP in performing well as evident from their positive effect on investment growth. Research limitations/implications – The limitations of this paper are mainly empirical. Further results with great policy implications could have been obtained if better proxies were developed for a number of variables. Certainly this is the case for the proxies used for cronyism and public-private dialogues (PPD). Practical implications – Tackling bureaucratic efficiency and independence and higher regulatory quality should be a top priority if the great positive externalities resulting from PPP in infrastructure are to be realized. Originality/value – The novelty of this research is attributed to constructing a proxy for PPP, as well as testing empirically the effect of the interactions of PPP with other institutional variables on the performance of infrastructural services (as evident from attracting more investment). The synthesis between the literature on PPP, new public management, networks, good governance, and institutional economics is another aspect of this work. The obtained results suggest important policy recommendations, and, the author hopes to, add to the literature on PPP.