Abstract

AbstractThe paper provides insights into an illicit trading system and explores the logics that contribute to its proliferation. It joins the literature on informal trading networks and revises conventional wisdom about what is necessary to sustain them. Gold traders have established intricate webs of relations based on personal dyadic affiliations. These extended networks are very heterogeneous, involving a multitude of actors, spanning regional, ethnic and social categories. Unlike many other examples in the anthropological literature, the gold trade is not a business carried out by members of a single ethnic group. Yet, explanation is required as to why, despite this heterogeneity, confidence between all actors is created, particularly in this case where there is no legal recourse when informal contracts are broken. I argue that a patron–client system of risk-sharing at various economic levels is the basis both for economic rationales and cohesion among all actors.

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