Abstract
The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on emergency rule, a practice that democratic theory has struggled to conceptualize. Accordingly, this article differs from existing approaches, which mainly focus on the constitutional design of regimes of exception and tend to identify the institution of the Roman dictator as their source. In contrast, we offer a comprehensive approach, considering other historical sources of emergency rule, going beyond the dichotomy of constitutional and de facto emergency, and focusing specifically on the types of emergency powers involved: executive, legislative and judicial. We propose a different way of conceptualizing emergency rule, following a political rather than a constitutional logic, and we illustrate this different conceptualization by offering evidence from Bolivia, Chile and Guatemala to demonstrate how this comprehensive approach works in practice.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.