Going beyond the expert-performance framework in the domain of chess

Abstract

Ericsson (2014, this issue) further sharpened the expert-performance framework and provided a critical review of the evidence presented in this special issue. The findings from the prototypical expertise domain of chess were interpreted by Ericsson to be consistent with his framework and he does not accept that general cognitive abilities can account for variance in expert performance. In this response, I argue (a) that Ericsson drew a biased picture of the research findings by using a very conservative definition of expert performance, (b) that Ericsson's main alternative explanation of the research findings in the domain of chess, i.e., selection processes in the access to training opportunities, is speculative and implausible, and (c) that central evidence from the extended expert–novice paradigm has not been considered in his review. Future research on the relation and interplay between general cognitive abilities and expertise needs to go beyond theories and methods of the expert-performance framework.