Godność człowieka w koncepcji Immanuela Kanta a doświadczenie Auschwitz

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze the Kantian concept of human dignity, which in the history of philosophy, especially after the Holocaust experience, has undergone significant changes. The three concepts presented here, created by Immanuel Kant, Edith Stein, and Martha Nussbaum are representative examples of this evolution. Kant recognizes dignity as a value and defines it by referring to specifically human features: rationality and freedom. In the conceptions of Stein and Nussbaum, not reason alone but also other human powers of mind and capabilities establish the foundation of the dignity of human being, for example, emotions or imagination. In addition, Nussbaum defines dignity on the basis of liberal political philosophy as a concept used to justify citizens' claims addressed to the state. The liberal approach unites freedom and dignity of a man, as the state and its institutions are recognized here as a result of the choice made by individuals, thus combining individual responsibility for their own choices with the responsibility for the constitutional structure of the state. Indeed, the evolution of the notion of dignity in the history of philosophy consists in the change from the attitude of admiration for the values of human reason and freedom to the respect for human rights and capabilities as expressed in rational and free political action.