God\u2019s place in the world

Matthew James Collier

doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09764-w

Abstract

Lewisian theism is the view that both traditional theism and Lewis’s modal realism are true. On Lewisian theism, God must exist in worlds in one of the following ways: (1) God can be said to have a counterpart in each world; (2) God can be said to exist in each world in the way that a universal can be said to exist in worlds (if universals exist), i.e. through transworld identity; (3) God can be said to be a scattered individual, with a part of God existing in each world; and, (4) God can be said to exist in each world, through His existing from the standpoint of each world. In the literature, (1)–(4) have been rejected as viable options. I grant that (1) and (3) are not viable. However, I believe that (2) and (4) have been too hastily rejected. Herein, I develop ways to respond to objections to (2) and (4), and conclude that (4) is a viable option for Lewisian theists.

Highlights

According to traditional theism, God exists necessarily
If we assume the truth of both modal realism and traditional theism, a view I call Lewisian theism, to say that God exists necessarily is to say that God exists in every modal realist world
Several authors argue that Lewisian theism is inconsistent, since they contend that all the most plausible ways for God to exist in worlds either commit Lewisian theists to rejecting tenets of traditional theism or commit Lewisian theists to rejecting tenets of modal realism

Summary

Introduction

God exists necessarily. According to the biconditional for necessity, to exist necessarily is to exist in all possible worlds. If Lewisian theists can argue that God’s being spatiotemporally connected to all worlds, through His being causally connected to worlds where worlds are isolated spacetimes, does not entail modal collapse, they can deny that Bill and Collier are wholly/wholly worldmates.

Results

Conclusion