God's Obligations

Abstract

The-notion that God has no moral is not new in history of philosophical theology; it was apparently held by Duns Scotus, for example.1 But in recent times it has been forcefully revived by William Alston. In Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,2 Alston holds that God has no moral obligations, that there is never anything God ought to do or ought to bring about, that it is never true to say of God that he ought not to act in a certain way. This is a view which has profound implications for philosophical theology, and fact that it is defended by Alston only enhances its significance for current discussion in philosophy of religion. In this instance, however, my own intuitions opposed to Alston's. I find it altogether natural to say that God has a moral obligation not to lie to his creatures, that God ought to keep his promises, that God ought not to betray those who trust in him. In earlier discussions of this issue with Alston, I put forward as an objection to his position claim that if God were to break his promise to one of his creatures, he would be doing what he ought not to do. In his article, Alston replies that my objection shows only that would be applicable to God under certain counterfactual conditions (indeed counterpossible conditions if God is essentially perfectly good), not that 'ought' is applicable to Him as things are (265). Alston does recognize point, of course: if God makes promises or covenants, then he is subject to obligations, since, as Alston observes, the very concept of a promise or of a covenant involves engendering obligations (265). But he holds that we ought to take biblical talk of God's promises and covenants as analogical or metaphorical speech. The literal truth behind such speech is just that God expresses an intention to act in certain ways, and we can rely on God's intentions. I think, on other hand, that conviction that God does really make promises and does really enter into