Abstract

The Global Navigation Satellite System is vulnerable to interference signals that can potentially disable the system, because the signal strength tends to be very weak. Interference such as jamming, which disables the receiver via excessively high signal strength in the satellite navigation frequency band, and spoofing, which induces the receiver to output erroneous position and time data via signals similar to actual navigation signals, disrupt satellite navigation systems. As the threat of interference is increasing, considerable research effort has been expended in an attempt to deal with it in various ways. Spoofing attacks are especially difficult to detect. This paper deals with a technique to detect a spoofing signal and to mitigate attacks on satellite navigation systems. The satellite navigation signal is influenced by the navigation satellite itself and errors due to environmental factors, and spoofing signal detection should be well reflected in the navigation signal. Especially, in the case of mobile receivers, it is not easy to detect a spoofing signal because the exact position of the receiver cannot be known. To detect a spoofing signal, additional hardware may be required; in some cases, heterogeneous sensors, such as inertial sensors, may be used. The technique introduced in this paper effectively discriminates spoofing signals based only on receiver measurements, without the need for additional devices. It generates test statistics based on the pseudorange, which is the measured value of the receiver position, and detects spoofing signals by setting the monitoring interval according to a “sliding window”. Because the proposed method uses output data and measurements obtained from the receiver, it can be applied to general receivers at low cost.

Highlights

  • Satellite navigation signals are vulnerable to interference signals; the ability to detect such interference is necessary, especially in systems in which high reliability is of the utmost importance

  • Satellite navigation interference can range from jamming, which disables the receiver via excessively high signal intensity in the satellite navigation frequency band, and spoofing, which induces the receiver to output erroneous position and time data via signals similar to actual navigation signals, thereby disrupting satellite navigation systems

  • To improve the ability to detect spoofing attacks on satellite navigation systems, the detection index and detection method should be set according to the characteristics of the navigation signal

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Summary

Introduction

Satellite navigation signals are vulnerable to interference signals; the ability to detect such interference is necessary, especially in systems in which high reliability is of the utmost importance. There is a method available for monitoring changes in the measurement values, as opposed to checking the correlation between the navigation solution and the measurement values This method monitors the discrepancy between the actual and calculated measurement values based on the satellite and receiver positions; it determines the spoofing signal when this value changes and can compensate for the limitations of the RAIM technique. To apply the CUSUM technique, the average value must be corrected continuously for comparison with the results of the RAIM method Both the chi-square test and CUSUM technique are effective for detecting changes in the spoofing signal, unlike the RAIM technique, the mean and standard deviation, which are the discrimination criteria for the spoofing signal, must be predicted correctly. If the value of an event exceeds 1, it is more likely to be a

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Conclusion
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