Abstract

Spoofing attacks are threatening the global navigation satellite system (GNSS). The maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)-based positioning technique is a direct positioning method originally developed for multipath rejection and weak signal processing. We find this method also has a potential ability for GNSS anti-spoofing since a spoofing attack that misleads the positioning and timing result will cause distortion to the MLE cost function. Based on the method, an estimation-cancellation approach is presented to detect spoofing attacks and recover the navigation solution. A statistic is derived for spoofing detection with the principle of the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT). Then, the MLE cost function is decomposed to further validate whether the navigation solution obtained by MLE-based positioning is formed by consistent signals. Both formulae and simulations are provided to evaluate the anti-spoofing performance. Experiments with recordings in real GNSS spoofing scenarios are also performed to validate the practicability of the approach. Results show that the method works even when the code phase differences between the spoofing and authentic signals are much less than one code chip, which can improve the availability of GNSS service greatly under spoofing attacks.

Highlights

  • The security of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) has caught more and more public attention because of the ever-increasing reliance on GNSS in our lives

  • The coherent integration time is 1 ms; the signals are sampled at a rate of 5 MHz; and the false alarm probability is set to 10−6

  • We develop an estimation-cancellation approach for GNSS spoofing detection and navigation solution recovery based on the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)-based positioning technique

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Summary

Introduction

The security of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) has caught more and more public attention because of the ever-increasing reliance on GNSS in our lives. Navigation message authentication (NMA) [12], attempt to prevent spoofing attacks by signal encryption or designing new GNSS signals, which are difficult to simulate These methods are, to some extent, vulnerable to the replay attacks, in which the spoofer estimates, manipulates and replays the cryptographically-secured GNSS signals in real time [13,14]. Unlike the RAIM technique, the proposed method can detect spoofing attacks when all of the channels of the victim receivers are taken over by the spoofing signals, and it can even work when the code phase differences between the authentic and spoofing signals are much less than one code chip.

Signal Model
Review on MLE-Based Positioning
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Position Estimation
MLE-Based GNSS Anti-Spoofing Method
Model of Spoofing Signal
Estimation-Cancellation Approach
Spoofing Validation and Recovery of Navigation Solution
Implementation Architecture
Simulation Results
Performance Evaluation with TEXBAT
Scenario 2 of TEXBAT
Scenario 6 of TEXBAT
Conclusions
Full Text
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