GNSS Spoofing Countermeasure With a Single Rotating Antenna

Abstract

Security of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) is important since the navigation capability provided by the GNSS is a key enabler for many civilian and military applications. Spoofing attacks threaten the GNSS security and have caught much attention recently. The spatial processing method is one of the most robust GNSS spoofing countermeasures, which detects spoofing signals with a moving antenna or multi-antenna, but it cannot work in a static single-antenna receiver. In this paper, we propose a spoofing countermeasure based on the power measurements of a single rotating antenna, which can be implemented in a static receiver. The method takes advantages of the anisotropy of the antenna’s gain pattern to detect spoofing signals. When the antenna is rotating, the power measurements of the spoofing signals coming from the same direction change similarly and the correlation coefficients between them are close to 1, but the power measurements of the authentic signals are uncorrelated. Since it is not easy to evaluate the anti-spoofing performance of the correlation coefficient, another metric named phase difference of power measurements is proposed. Its theoretical performance is derived based on generalized likelihood ratio test and validated with simulations. Actual experiments indicate that both the simulated and meaconing spoofing signals can be distinguished from the authentic ones, and the method can be implemented in a static or low-dynamic conventional receiver, only with an additional low-cost rotary table.