Gömbös Gyula by Jenő Gergely (review)

Abstract

570 SEER, 8o, 3, 2002 good or ill from i 887, when he first arrived there as a cadet. In I9I8 he planned to follow up the liberation of Finland by liberating Petrogradfrom the Bolsheviks, in concert with the White Russians. Despite their obvious need, the White leaders would not recognize Finnish independence. The strategicagenda for all Russian leadersfrom Peterto Stalinwas to extend the defensive outer-works of the city as far as possible. It was for this reason Finland became a Russian Grand Duchy in I809. An independent Finland would be a threat, and the regime that made such a concession would be admitting their own weakness. Stalin's war in I939-40, and the post war settlement were all conditioned by strategicissues. Mannerheim's secret was his recognition of the primacy of strategic concerns in the Russian view of Finland. Screen waited a long time to complete thisstudy,but accessto key archives and the development of Finnish historyhave made the wait worthwhile.The resultis in every way the equal of the firstinstalment, and completes the best study of Mannerheim available in English, or any other language. Screen writesclearlyand persuasively,while his masteryof evidence, skilfulhandling of sourcesand deep insight,make this a profound text. Mannerheim emerges as a servant of the state, and a man with a deep rooted love of his country. The pridehe took in his achievementswas only human. Department of WarStudies A. D. LAMBERT King's College, London Gergely, Jen6. Gdmbds Gyula.Vince Kiad6, Budapest, 2001. 352 pp. Photographs .Notes. Bibliography.Index. HFT 2495. IT is a clear indicationof the extent to which the historyof inter-warHungary has been neglected that this should be the firstbiography of Gyula Gomb6s, primeministerof Hungaryfrom I932-36, to be publishedsince 1942. We can discount an earlier, and rather unsubstantial, effort by the same author, published in I999, which he himself described as merely an 'outline' (vazlat). This presentbiographyis an altogethermore seriouswork.It makesthe case, if case was needed, that Gombos was one of the most importantpoliticiansin inter-warHungary. The author argues that Gombos was a key player in the i9I9 'counterrevolution ' againstBela Kun's Rdterepublik, and also that he was instrumental in the (re)creationof a 'governingparty'that would rule Hungary until 1944. He is portrayed as the leading proponent of the emerging radical right-wing (fijv&d6) ideology throughout the I920S both from within the governing party and during his spell in opposition from I923-I928. As state secretary and then head of the defence ministry from 1928-36 he is credited with the expansion and modernization of the army. Finally as prime minister the author regards him as having succeeded in revitalizing the economy, introducing a degree of social reform, reshaping the governing party in his own image, and placing Hungarian foreign policy firmlyon a pro-German, pro-Italian course that would ultimately result in a successfulrevision of the Trianon peace treaty. REVIEWS 571 Not only a reconsiderationof Gombos's importanceis, however, at stakein this work.The author is also at pains to show that earliercharacterizationsof Gombos as a pompous proto-fascistarewide of the mark.Whilstseveraltimes denying that his is a revisionistapproach, the author neverthelessarguesthat Gombos was a skilfulpolitician who from the late I920S quietly abandoned his earlier radicalism,instead focusing on practical solutions to the very real problems that beset Hungary throughout the inter-war period. The author argues that Gombos's policies as prime minister were also shaped by a cautious assessmentof the damage that any radical changes might do to the constitutional and social fabric. Overall these points are well argued, and serve at the very least to focus the reader's attention on the complex and changing elements of Gombos'spolitical ideology. These argumentsdo, however, lose something due to the lack of context in which they are presented. This is a work that focuses almost exclusively on Gombos, and deals with wider events only so far as they had a direct impact on his own ideas and policies. Not only is there no comparativeconsideration of other (east) European politicians on the radical right, but even leading Hungarian politicians such as Istvan Bethlen and the regent Miklos Horthy are only mentioned when they have an immediate impact...