Global Synchronization of Pulse-Coupled Oscillator Networks Under Byzantine Attacks

Abstract

Synchronization of pulse-coupled oscillators (PCOs) has gained significant attention recently due to their increased applications in sensor networks and wireless communications. Given the distributed and unattended nature of wireless sensor networks, it is imperative to enhance the resilience of PCO synchronization against malicious attacks. However, most existing results on attack-resilient pulse-based synchronization are obtained under assumptions of all-to-all coupling topologies or restricted initial phase distributions. In this paper, we propose a new pulse-based synchronization mechanism to improve the attack resilience of PCO synchronization that is applicable to non-all-to-all networks. Under the proposed synchronization mechanism, we prove that perfect synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed in the presence of multiple Byzantine attackers who can emit attack pulses arbitrarily without any constraint except that practical bit rate constraint renders the number of pulses from an attacker to be finite. The new mechanism can guarantee synchronization even when the initial phases of all legitimate oscillators are arbitrarily distributed in the entire oscillation period, which is in distinct difference from most existing attack-resilient synchronization approaches (including the seminal paper from Lamport and Melliar-Smith [1]) that require a priori (almost) synchronization among legitimate oscillators. Numerical simulation results are given to confirm the theoretical results.