Global Navigation Satellite System Spoofing Detection in Inertial Satellite Navigation Systems

Abstract

The susceptibility of global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) to interference significantly limits the possibility of their use. From the standpoint of possible consequences, the most dangerous interference is the so-called spoofing. Simultaneously, in most cases of GNSS use, an inertial navigation system (INS) or an attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) is also present on the board of mobile objects. In this regard, the research goal is to assess the possibility of detecting GNSS spoofing in inertial satellite navigation systems. This paper examines the method for detecting GNSS spoofing by combining a pair of commercially available GNSS receivers and antennas with an INS or AHRS. The method is based on a comparison of the double differences of GNSS carrier phase measurements performed by receivers under conditions of resolved integer ambiguity and the values of the range double differences predicted using an INS. GNSS carrier phase integer ambiguity can be resolved using a strapdown inertial navigation system (SINS) or AHRS data. The mathematical model of GNSS phase difference measurements and the SINS-predicted satellite range differences model are given. The proposed algorithm calculates the moving average of the residuals between the SINS-predicted satellite range double differences and the measured GNSS carrier phase double differences. The primary criterion for spoofing detection is the specified threshold excess of the moving average of the double difference residuals. Experimental studies are performed using simulation and hardware-in-the-loop simulation. The experimental results allow us to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach and estimate the potential characteristics of the spoofing detection algorithm based on it.