Abstract
We provide a framework for the study of global games with noisy sharing of information. In contrast to the previous works where it is shown that an intuitive threshold policy is an equilibrium for such games, we show that noisy sharing of information leads to non-existence of such an equilibrium. We also investigate the group best-response dynamics of two groups of agents sharing the same information to threshold policies based on each group's observation and show the convergence of such dynamics.
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