Abstract

Adults recognize that if event A predicts event B, intervening on A might generate B. Research suggests that young children have difficulty making this inference unless the events are initiated by goal-directed actions [1]. The current study tested the domain-generality and development of this phenomenon. Replicating previous work, when the events involved a physical outcome, toddlers (mean: 24 months) failed to generalize the outcome of spontaneously occurring predictive events to their own interventions; toddlers did generalize from prediction to intervention when the events involved a psychological outcome. We discuss these findings as they bear on the development of causal concepts.

Highlights

  • Causal representations are central to human cognition

  • Adults are adept at reasoning about causal events initiated by an intentional, goaldirected action, an inanimate object, or an unobserved entity

  • Considerable research suggests the sophistication of children’s causal reasoning even early in development [5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15], children are almost uniformly asked to reason about events initiated by dispositional agents

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Summary

Introduction

Causal representations are central to human cognition. They support prediction, explanation, and intervention and underlie folk theories across domains [2,3,4]. Evidence that event A predicts event B suggests the possibility that intervening on A might generate B (i.e., intervening on A to see if B occurs is a good way to learn whether the relationship is genuinely causal) Both fouryear-olds and toddlers readily learned the predictive relationship, only four-year-olds anticipated the outcome following their intervention (i.e., looked towards the toy after placing the block in contact with the base). If toddlers lack a domain-general concept of causation and only integrate prediction and action when events are initiated by agents, they should fail to represent the predictive event as a causal event in both conditions because the block always begins to move spontaneously; agents are never involved in initiating the events.

Results
Findings
Materials and Methods
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