Abstract
The present study utilized a repeated cross-sectional survey design to examine belief in conspiracy theories about the abduction of Natascha Kampusch. At two time points (October 2009 and October 2011), participants drawn from independent cross-sections of the Austrian population (Time Point 1, N = 281; Time Point 2, N = 277) completed a novel measure of belief in conspiracy theories concerning the abduction of Kampusch, as well as measures of general conspiracist ideation, self-esteem, paranormal and superstitious beliefs, cognitive ability, and media exposure to the Kampusch case. Results indicated that although belief in the Kampusch conspiracy theory declined between testing periods, the effect size of the difference was small. In addition, belief in the Kampusch conspiracy theory was significantly predicted by general conspiracist ideation at both time points. The need to conduct further longitudinal tests of conspiracist ideation is emphasized in conclusion.
Highlights
Conspiracy theories refer to explanations of important events, such as war, natural disasters, and poverty, which include “appeals to the intentional deception and manipulation of those involved in, affected by, or witnessing these events” (Basham, 2003, p. 91)
In the present study, we examined the temporal stability of belief in conspiracy theories concerning the kidnapping case of Natascha Kampusch
It is worth noting that, our measure included a number of disparate claims, it was apparent from our factor analysis that the items in our measure reduced to a single dimension at both time points
Summary
Conspiracy theories refer to explanations of important events, such as war, natural disasters, and poverty, which include “appeals to the intentional deception and manipulation of those involved in, affected by, or witnessing these events” (Basham, 2003, p. 91). Academic investigations have tended to view conspiracy theorizing as the result of pathology, both on the grounds of morality and rationality (e.g., Hofstadter, 1966; Donskis, 1998; Darwin et al, 2011; Swami et al, 2013) Such perspectives include the implicit suggestion that conspiracist ideation fosters dysfunctionality and, stunts any form of agency on the part of conspiracist actors (e.g., Quimby, 1993; Thomas and Quinn, 1993). A growing body of work has argued that such a lens of psychopathology is deficient (Swami and Coles, 2010; Swami and Furnham, 2013), as it fails to recognize the way in which ordinary actors use conspiracy theories to construct complex arguments in relation to intergroup relations and to challenge political, ideological, and social hegemony (Sapountzis and Condor, 2013). Conspiracy theories in general remain popular (Swami and Furnham, 2013), individual conspiracy theories may vary across a number of dimensions, such as www.frontiersin.org
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