Abstract
Carol Gilligan's body of work in moral development psychology is of the first importance for moral philosophy.' At the same time certain philosophical commitments within contemporary ethics constitute obstacles to appreciating this importance. Some of these commitments are shared by Lawrence Kohlberg, whose work provided the context for Gilligan's early (though not current) work. I will discuss some of the implicit and explicit philosophical differences between Gilligan's and Kohlberg's outlooks and will then defend Gilligan's views against criticisms which, drawing on categories of contemporary ethical theory, a Kohlbergian can and does make of them. Gilligan claims empirical support for the existence of a moral outlook or orientation distinct from one based on impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universal principle. This impartialist conception of morality, as I will call it, 2 in addition to characterizing Kohlberg's view of morality, has been the dominant conception of morality in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, forming the core of both
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