Ghana’s Competitive Clientelism and Space for Long-Term Stable Policies

Michael Ehis Odijie,Mohammed Zayan Imoro

doi:10.1177/21582440211031513

Abstract

Given the close election results and the winner-takes-all nature of politics in Ghana, researchers have argued that the two parties are now characterized by a high degree of vulnerability, which in turn provides strong incentives for ruling elites in both parties to find strategies to ensure their political survival. This results in the distribution of state resources to political supporters and short-termism, which weakens the possibility of building a broad political consensus on any national development issues. Using the case of Ghana’s Right to Information Bill, this article will argue that there are conditions under which elite commitment to long-term development could be fostered and sustained in competitive clientelist political settings like Ghana.

Highlights

For social scientists studying the nature of state and politics in Ghana, there is both good news and bad news
The analysis of the process that ended with the passage of the Right to Information (RTI) in Ghana focuses on how civil society exploited competitive clientelism for its own ends, as it did when promoting transparency in the oil industry
When more than a hundred Civil society organizations (CSO) came together to create a common platform for oil management in Ghana, the group succeeded in influencing government policies in ways that are difficult to imagine under competitive clientelism

Summary

Introduction

For social scientists studying the nature of state and politics in Ghana, there is both good news and bad news. Our research shows that civil society groups (which we conceptualize in competitive electoral terms as representing swing voters), through collective action, have exploited Ghana’s highly competitive political environment to realize the RTI. The analysis of the process that ended with the passage of the RTI in Ghana focuses on how civil society exploited competitive clientelism for its own ends, as it did when promoting transparency in the oil industry.

Results

Conclusion